The timing of elections is flexible in many countries. We study this optimization, by first creating a Bayesian learning model of a mean-reverting political support process. We then explore optimal electoral timing, modeling it as a renewable American option with interacting waiting and stopping values. Inter alia, we show that the expected longevity is a convex-then-concave function of the support. Finally, we calibrate our model to the post 1945 Labour-Tory U.K. rivalry. Our story quite well explains when the elections were called. We also show that election options approximately double the expected time in power in the current streak. * This supersedes a manuscript Optimal Electoral Timing in a Parliamentary Democracy (2000) that was an unpublished PhD thesis chapter of Dmitry Davydov, joint with Lones Smith. That paper was a three-party calibration exercise, and was not testable. This paper differs in many other respects, and so must be considered wholly new. We thank
INTRODUCTION
Timing lies at the heart of many economic decisions, and the option to choose when to act often has immense value. This has been the subject of a large literature in economics, most especially in finance. Building on the insights from finance about option pricing, this paper instead revisits a classic political economy question: optimal electoral timing.
In a key thread of a parliamentary democracy's fabric, the incumbent often has some flexibility in choosing when it faces the electorate. We first develop a theoretical model of the decision problem facing the government in deciding when to call an election. We then proceed to illustrate it using the post-WWII experience of the United Kingdom. A newly elected government there must call an election within five years, but generally acts in advance of this binding terminal constraint. While the tradition is to call the election around the four year mark, the actual exercise time has ranged from six to sixty months. In theory, we find that optimally exercising this option has tremendous value, approximately doubling the expected time in power versus running the term out. And in practice, it offers insights into the electoral success of the Conservatives (simply: the Tories).
For some context, imagine a government in power that sees its monthly standing in the polls, and must choose to call an election before its mandate expires. Suppose that an encouraging confluence of events sees its standing surging by 8%. Should it call a snap election now? Obviously, this depends on a host of considerations, ranging from the practical (perhaps it must first pass a budget) to the sociological (maybe the electorate will punish it for "opportunism"). We focus on just one consideration, as we assume that the government simply wishes to maximize its expected total time in power in the current streak. We find that this has significant explanatory power for the election times.
Naturally, the government should call election (i) the closer to the end of the term, and (ii) the higher its political support. To characterize this tradeoff, we draw the analogy of the electoral timing choice to the optimal exercise time of an American option -i.e. the right to buy or sell a stock in a fixed window of time at a moment of one's choosing.
Yet the theory underlying our story is harder in several dimensions. First, an election is not at all like an asset sale: An investor choosing to exercise a financial option early need not ever think beyond its maximum term. On the other hand, a government that "sells its mandate" early in an election thereafter wins it back if it succeeds; this "renewal option" is forward-looking over an infinite horizon. Second, asset prices are perfectly observed, while a government only sees a noisy signal of its standing from the polls. Third, the stochastic process of asset prices is well-developed and tractable (geometric Brownian motion), but there exists no similar model of the popular standing of a government.
We begin by addressing this last omission first. Our model is tractable and captures three key features of the political process in a left-right rivalry: voter heterogeneity, the fickle fortunes of political parties, and the continuous onslaught of media information.
The theory of voting is itself an area of much research. For simplicity, we assume a continuum of politically heterogeneous voters wish to vote for the current "best governing party". This best party is assumed unobserved by all. To wit, right and left wing supporters alike wish to vote Tory if Labour is a mess, but right is far more readily convinced to vote Tory than is left. Namely, ordinal preferences coincide -i.e. all prefer the best party -but cardinal preferences diverge. This blend subsumes political ideologues (extreme cardinal preferences), and a varying intensity of political allegiances across voters.
Next, towards a political ebb and flow, we assume that the best party periodically and randomly changes according to a continuous time Markov process. Voters continuously learn over time about this unobserved Markovian state from the news media. This is achieved in our model with a simple Bayesian device: Voters constantly observe the outcome of a Brownian motion with uncertain drift. This drift represents the best partyhigh when the best party is right, say, and low when the best party is left. This yields in Lemma 1 a simple continuous time stochastic process for the political slant, the current posterior chance that the best party is right. As the best party periodically switches, this stochastic process is mean-reverting. Its long-run distribution is so well-behaved that we are able to precisely compute it (Lemma 3). Once we assume an exponential distribution over the strength of political beliefs, the political slant equals the fraction of voters that support it (Lemma 4). This brings us to a Bayesian law of motion for political support. At the end of this exercise, a party's support reflects political leanings, and yet evolves in a Bayes-rational fashion to reflect new information. We have not found another rationallyderived support process. Ours is so tractable that it should prove useful in future work.
This brings us to our second contribution on the timing problem itself. The government continuously entertains a waiting value depending on the political slant and time left, and stops when it coincides with a slant-dependent stopping value. It calls an election when its political standing first hits a nonlinear stopping barrier. Since the winning government re-acquires the election-calling option, the stopping value is recursively defined in terms of future waiting values -a novel feature. Also, the government only has access to noisy polling data, and does not know its true support. Because the optimal exercise time for the finite horizon American put option is not analytically known, our harder optimization problem can only be numerically solved. Still, we prove existence of the solution of this recursive option (Proposition 2), and then characterize it by variational equations (Proposition 3). The expected longevity is a convex-then-concave function of the support. We also analytically study how the optimal strategy responds to parametric shifts. Elections, eg., tend to be later with more volatile political support.
Our third contribution is an empirical test of our timing model, and our finding that timing matters, i.e., the option is valuable. We motivate the relevance in two ways. For a bigger quick motivational picture, we seek a large cross section of similar two party democracies that have been around a long time. Since democracy is so young, we choose the provinces of Canada and states of the USA. We find that provincial governments (with flexible electoral timing) have lasted significantly (50%) more than the state governors.
To say anything stronger, our model must be calibrated to a specific case.
We next calibrate our polling process to the U.K., for it is the parliamentary democracy with the longest time series of voting intention polls, and its two big parties, Labour and Tory, have won all the elections after World War II. We use public polling data from and the seventeen elections . We estimate the polling process parameters from the polling data: They are statistically significant, and do not statistically depend on whether an election campaign is in progress. We show that volatility amounts to 48% of the average poll, versus 14% for the S&P 500. We also document the extremely fast mean reversion that drives the polls: Regardless of the initial poll, its expected value three years later lies within 1% of its mean level. This corresponds to an underlying 2.5 year "political cycle" for the unobserved political state to return its initial position.
We use the estimated polling process parameters to solve for the optimal election times. We compare the predicted and realized election times. With just one explanatory variable apart from the elapsed time, our theory explains 44% of the variation in the timing decisions of governments not troubled by weak or minority governments. Also, if we additionally assume sufficiently impatient prime ministers, who earn no flow utility from weak or minority governments, then our model explains 39% of all election timing variation. Both of these fits are consistent with our idea that a major determinant of when governments call elections is their desire to maximize their expected time in power (or their expected discounted time, in the latter case), using public polling information.
Our paper also offers a useful normative message. The freedom to optimally time the next election clearly confers upon an incumbent government an advantage unavailable in fixed election cycle regimes. For instance, one can postpone the election until the economy is looking up. Our model quantifies the long-run average magnitude of this advantage, about doubling the expected time in power in the U.K. If the U.K. implemented a fixed electoral cycle with four year terms, then the expected duration in power would fall by a factor of 1.8 for Labour (from 15.9 to 9.0 years), and by slightly less for Tory (from 12.4 to 7.5 years). Flexible terms on average benefit the more popular party more than the less popular party. Constitutional designers should be aware of the magnitude of this differential effect in choosing amongst fixed and flexible electoral terms.
Literature Review. Balke (1990) showed that majority governments trade off current time in power against uncertain future time in their election timing decisions. Following on this observation, Lesmono, Tonkes, and Burrage (2003) is the closest paper to ours.
They also analogize election timing to American option theory.
1 In contrast to their paper, our underlying political support process is different, which should come as no surprise as we derive it from a Bayesian learning foundation. Their model's implied political support process mean reverts about 1/2 (i.e., the long-run mean is fixed to 1/2), it does not consider polling error, and their model is not well-defined if the support process has a high volatility. Further, we prove the existence of the solution, characterize the value function and the optimal policy by using variational equations, and give comparative statics. We also test empirically how well the model explains the realized elections times.
There is a large literature on timing and political business cycles. 2 For instance, Palmer (2000) finds that macroeconomic and political variables affect election timing.
Better economic indicators lead to early elections. In our paper, governments take the polling process as a given, and optimize their election timing. Diermeier and Merlo (2000) argue that majority governments are so common because minorities are fragile.
Our paper relates to work on sequential optimal stopping problems in finance and elsewhere. Sequential American options are studied in optimal harvesting problems (e.g. Alvarez and Shepp (1998) ), executive options with the so-called "reload" feature (e.g. Dybvig and Loewenstein (2003) ), mortgage refinancing (e.g. Hurst and Stafford (2004) ), and firms' optimal recapitalization (e.g. Peura and Keppo (2006) ). Putting aside two other difficulties of our option -measurement error and election delay 3 -we believe that ours 1 This paper was unavailable when our precursor, Davydov and Smith (2000) , was written. 2 See also Ellis and Thoma (1991) , Kayser (2005b), and Chowdhury (1993) . Kayser (2005a) derives a model to predict the degree of opportunistic election timing and manipulation under alternate institutional structures. Smith (1996 Smith ( , 2004 considers election timing with strategic signalling by assuming that the choice of election date reveals information about the government.
3 Sanders (2003) analyzes polling error, and Alvarez and Keppo (2002) study the effect of delays.
is the first renewable American option studied with a finite exercise time horizon. This creates a nonstationary decision rule over time, and is the source of interest in this paper.
We solve for the nonlinear exercise boundary for the electoral timing problem.
Structure of the Paper. In Section 2, we show that electoral flexibility has been useful in practice. Section 3 describes the model, and §4 the theoretical election timing results.
In §5, we estimate the model parameters with U.K. polling data, and then test it in §6. In §7, we price the U.K. electoral option and §8 concludes. Appendix A gathers some proofs, while Appendix B describes the numerical solution of the optimal stopping problem.
THE ELECTORAL TIMING OPTION IN HISTORY
The United Kingdom is an ideal candidate for exploring the electoral timing option -it has flexible electoral terms, a long polling series, and a long two party alternation. But since we claim that the timing option has value, it would be helpful to see this evidenced in a wider cross-section drawn from other countries with both fixed and flexible electoral terms. Alas, democracy is young, and the democratic countries of the world are diverse.
Some are de facto one-party states (like Mexico or Japan), about which any electoral theory must be silent. Many are multi-party states where electoral streaks are rare.
We now find the value of the electoral option evidenced in a wide cross-section of the national and state/provincial governments of Canada and the U.S.A. Hereby, we compare two geographically and culturally close older democracies with two contending parties.
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Since we do not control for a host of other factors, this section is purely motivational.
Canada has flexible election timing (between 0 and 5 years) and U.S.A. fixed terms (4 years). 5 In Canada, the winner is the party supplying the prime minister or premiers, and for the U.S.A., we restricted attention to the presidency and the governorships. Our theory also assumes an easy information flow to the electorate about the merits of the competing parties. We begin with the first regime shift after 1930 (so that a power shift exists). Canada became a fully autonomous country in 1931, which makes this a focal starting decade. Also, if we choose earlier years, the parties have different names. 4 We eliminate the Democratic one-party state of Georgia, and the states/provinces where three parties have won: Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, and Oregon, and B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. A two party alternation obtains in all other states, provinces, and national governments.
5 Gubernatorial term limits (www.termlimits.org/Current Info/State TL/gubernatorial.html) apply in several states. About 10% of all governorships after 1930 ended due to term limits. The estimated chance that the ruling party changes after the term limit is active is 0.58 and 0.44 when the term limit is not active. At a 5% significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis of identical estimates. So we ignore term limits here.
For each state, province, or country, we ask how many consecutive years the same government is in power. Delaware, eg., had its first post-1930 change of power in 1967; the government parties then changed power in 1971, 1987, 1991, and 1999 . This yields five "ruling periods" over 1967-2005, or an average duration of 38/5 = 7.6 years, or 1.9
terms. Altogether, we have 46 data points for the USA, and six for Canada. We find that the average government duration is 8.19 years for the U.S.A. and 15.43 for Canadain other words, 2.05 four year terms for the U.S.A. and 3.09 five year terms for Canada.
Using a pooled t-test, we find that t = 2.58; we can confidently reject the hypothesis of equal mean numbers of terms. Clearly, the electoral timing option has significant value. 6, 7 We now try to precisely analyze this option, and then test it for the U.K. 6 A private member's motion was introduced into Canada's House of Commons in 2004 to shift the country towards fixed four year terms. Commenting on election timing, the bill's sponsor said anyone in power would "call the election in the most self-serving moment for ourselves and you'd be a fool not to." The Canadian provinces of B.C. and Ontario have recently informally changed to fixed four year terms. 7 The Canadian province of Quebec had a separatist government from 1976-1999. It seemed agreed that a majority in a referendum would allow the provincial government to initiate political separation from the rest of Canada. Trying to best time this vote using polling data proved an important activity, and resulted in pro-separation votes just shy of 40% and 50% in the referenda called in 1980 and 1990. 8 In the empirical analysis we focus only on voters of the two big parties in U.K. While the number of the big party voters could be stochastic, this would not matter since we model only proportions there. Our model extends to any number of parties, and in fact, Davydov and Smith (2000) considered three. To avoid the complexity of a multidimensional stopping time problem, we simply allow two here.
THE DYNAMIC POLITICAL PROCESS
share a common understanding -a political slant -p(t) = P [θ(t) = R] that the optimal party is R. The electorate can be viewed as "right-leaning" exactly when p(t) > 0.5. This informational filtering story yields a tractable process for our analysis.
Voters freely learn about the political state from the newspaper, television, or radio.
Specifically, we posit a Gaussian public information process ξ in continuous time: In other words, it is captured by the stochastic differential equation
for some Wiener process Z(t) and slopes µ R > µ L . More concretely, in state θ, in any ∆t time interval, ∆ξ(t) is normally distributed, with mean µ θ ∆t, variance γ 2 ∆t, and signals conditionally independent over time. So when the process greatly drifts up, the slant p(t) rises; when it greatly drifts down, the slant falls. But all movements in ξ(t) are obscured by high frequency noise, and so updating occurs slowly. Moscarini and Smith (2001) argue that this has some nice properties. For instance, it is a continuously unfolding ('non-lumpy') news process -its informativeness almost surely vanishes in the length of the time interval -and it is a time stationary ('constant intensity') process.
Since beliefs are constructed from information, the information process ξ(·) is clearly sufficient for the political slant process p(·). But the reverse holds true too: Theorem 9.1 of Liptser and Shiryayev (1977) and Keller and Rady (1999) derive the next law of motion.
Lemma 1 (Dynamics)
The political slant p(t) given signal ξ(t) obeys Bayes' rule:
where
The drift expression is intuitive. The mean slant b is the fraction of the time we switch into state R. The mean reversion speed a is the flow switching chance. The noise term reflects
Parameters a and b describe the political dynamics, while σ summarizes the quality of the information process. The more revealing is the public information process ξ(t) -as measured by the "signal-to-noise ratio" (µ R − µ L )/γ -the more volatile is the slant process. The parameter a captures the speed of convergence to the mean b. Intuitively, the expected slant reverts to b also, and at the exponential rate a. In the Appendix, we prove: In the model we assume these parameters are known, and derive the voting process below in Proposition 1. This result then allows us to estimate them in Section 5 from polling data.
For example, starting with full Labour support, i.e. at p = 0, the expected slant after 3 years lies within 1% of the mean b, by Lemma 2 for the estimated U.K. parameter a = 1.59 (see §5.C). With such fast mean reversion speed, parties need not be very farsighted, since winning big is not much better than winning small. This speaks to the brief U.K. "political cycle" -the expected time it takes for the state to switch from L to R and
Thus, there is time for more than one reversal of fortune during a typical electoral term.
A particularly convenient property of this political slant process is that its long-run density is analytically quite tractable, as we now assert (and prove in the Appendix).
Lemma 3 (The Long Run Density) The political slant process p(t) forever remains in (0, 1), and the stationary political slant density ψ(p) is given by: Figure 1 depicts the long run density for the U.K. parameters estimated in §5.C. Since this density is single-peaked, this in itself is a finding of the model, because one can show that not all densities of Lemma 3 are hill-shaped. Rather, the density ψ(p) is U-shaped for high belief variances σ. For then, state switches quickly become known, and the political slant spends most of its time near 0 or 1. We have found that this is not true for the U.K.
Also, since the estimated b < 0.5 for the U.K, the process favors L -on average, L is ahead P (p ≤ 0.5) = 70% of the time. So the U.K. enjoys a left-slant. 
from L, and p(t)v from R (see Figure 2) . A far-sighted voter might rationally anticipate the mean reversion of the state and vote against his immediate preferences. We ignore such higher order rationalizations, assuming that voters choose
and L if p(t) < u/(u + v) . So a voter becomes more left-leaning (or right leaning) as u/v → ∞ (or 0), and in the limit, never votes R (or L). This framework subsumes doctrinaire voters as a special case.
Lemma 4 (Political Slants Become Electoral Support) If preference parameters u and v are independently and identically distributed across voters, and they have a common exponential density, then p(t) is the fraction of voters for party R in any election at time t.
Proof : The fraction of voters supporting party R is the total fraction of the parameters
p(t). This equals the double integral
The exponential distribution ideally captures the fact that extreme preferences are very rare. But its primary benefit is that it produces a tractable theory for which the stochastic process of support for the right party R exactly coincides with the political slant p.
Proposition 1 (Dynamics) The process (1) gives the electoral support dynamics for R.
This result is key to the analytic and empirical tractability of our model. In other words, we now have a Bayesian learning-based law of motion (1) for the support of the parties.
OPTIMAL ELECTORAL TIMING

Stopping and Waiting Values
We assume that the government seeks to maximize the expected total time in power in the current streak. One might think of this as the objective of the Prime Minister, since he usually is not around after falling from power. Alternatively, it is hard for a government to think beyond the current streak, since it is not able to affect the timing of an election for many years to come. But as it turns out, the difference between winning big and small is so negligible that concern for elections long after one is defeated has essentially no effect on electoral timing. The government opts whether to call an election or not, weighing the cost of losing the rest of the current term with an earlier election against the benefits of a higher re-election chance. After any election, the next must be called within T years.
Once called, a fixed delay time δ > 0 passes during the campaign. This delay is critical for us, since the ruling party does not know the outcome of the election when it is called.
The decision to call an election is an optimal stopping exercise. The stopping time τ is a function of the remaining time until the next election T − t and the political slant p(t).
When the ruling party i follows an optimal strategy, we denote its expected time in power at time t by The payoffs at the stopping time τ are Ω(p(τ )), for the recursively defined function:
The value of a standard put or call option is continuous in the underlying price. Thus, the option is not worth much when it is only slightly "in the money" at the expiration date. By contrast, one vote can separate the glory of victory from the sting of defeat with elections: Landing slightly "out of the money" is discontinuously worse than the alternative. To wit, Ω includes a binary option in (2) paying at maturity the "asset or nothing" -here, paying F or zero. As Ω lacks an optimal timing exercise, it is a "European option".
Easily, since a government has the option of running out its full term, this is a lower 
, and F R (p, 4). Party R should not call an election at any time t
bound on its longevity:
Forward-looking behavior generally entails an earlier election, since we care about the expected value Ω(p) once the election is called.
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Since this is the sum of the time until the election and the continuation value, we have:
By recursive equations (2) and (3), F (p, t) is an American option on the binary European option Ω. These must be solved numerically -since even the standard non-recursive American put option with a geometric Brownian motion is not analytically solved. This exercise is illustrated in Figure 3 , and Appendix B gives the numerical algorithm.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Smooth Values) There exist
This is proven by recursive means in Appendix A.
Define the expected drift AF (p, t)dt of the waiting value F (p, t) on [t, t + dt):
By Proposition 2, AF (p, t) is well-defined. Intuitively in (4), we see that F changes in t by F t dt; the drifting political slant on average pushes F by F pp (dp) Next we analyze the optimal exercise strategy of this electoral option.
Proposition 3 (Optimality)
The best election time is the first time τ before T such that
(a) Calling an election is always an option:
The value is expected to fall daily by at least one day:
where for each political slant p and time t, one of the inequalities (a) or (b) is tight.
These are standard variational inequalities (see e.g. Øksendal, 2003) for the value (3). For
says that "when waiting is better than stopping, the unit flow payoff balances the expected time lost in office." Here, the waiting value F (p, t) is expected to fall one day for every day in office until the election is called (while t < τ ). Once the waiting and continuation values coincide, F = Ω, further delay hurts. Figure 4 illustrates the situation. By complementary slackness, the government either waits or calls an election, i.e., one of inequalities (a) or (b) is tight.
Stock option values are convex in the underlying price, simply because greater risk pushes weight into the exercise tail ("in the money"). This convenient property holds for the electoral option. Observe that if the waiting value F is convex in p, then as an
by Jensen's inequality for all random variables P .
The Appendix shows how to reverse this logic, and deduce that because information both has value to the government, and adds variance to the belief, the function F is convex.
Lemma 5 (The Convex Waiting Value) The waiting value F (p, t) is a convex function of the political slant p for all times
Define the time value of the electoral option 
For part (a), an American option is worth more with a longer time horizon in (3). The
Appendix proves (b). Part (c) follows from (b), as each path p(t) rises in the parameter b. 
Election Barriers and Election Timing
For t < T , the election barrier The Appendix reformulates the optimal stopping problem using smooth pasting.
Lemma 7 (The Boundary Value Problem)
In the continuation region, the waiting value F solves the partial differential equation 1 + AF (p, t) = 0, for the boundary conditions:
While Ω is globally smooth in p, the stopping value F is only smooth in the continuation region. Thus, the second derivatives need not be matched, but may be strictly ranked.
Proof: By Proposition 3 and Lemma 7,
≥ 0 left of the barrier, and
Since both derivatives exist by Proposition 2, inequality follows by taking limits. For party L, the argument proceeds right of the barrier.
The Appendix proves that optimal election barriers are monotone.
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity)
The election barriers are both continuous and monotonic.
In particular, β The government calls an election when the political slant hits the stopping barrier β(·).
Upon winning, it acquires a new waiting value function φ(p) ≡ F (p, 0+), calculated from (3) by taking the limit t ↓ 0. As the next election is so far into the future, the margin of victory should have an insignificant impact on the expected time in power: For as we will verify in §5-C, the mean reversion in the U.K. is so fast that the slant p is expected to lie within 1% of the mean within three years. So one can approximate the stopping value by
Governments can essentially act as if they are just trying to win back a single fixed term of length, not looking past the next election. We see that Ω intuitively inherits the convexconcave shape of the victory chance V , as in Figure 3 .
From (2) and the victory chance definition we get a sandwich for the stopping values
By Lemma 8, these upper and lower bounds of the stopping value Ω share a convexconcave shape. In Figure 3 , we see that φ(0) and φ(1) are close. Pushing a little harder on the fast mean reversion of the slant, the initial margin of victory only slightly affects the expected time in power. This suggests writing (5) as
(a constant). The above sandwich inequality therefore offers some analytical support for the observed convex-concave shape of Ω.
The numerical simulation in Figure 3 also suggests that elections are called at political slant levels where Ω is concave. We can formally establish a slightly weaker result: 
then waiting is profitable. This holds under the given conditions.
As an application, if in addition to (5), the second derivative approximation
Likewise, Ω L (p) should be convex for all p ≥ 1/2 when b > 1/2. Lemma 9 would then imply that party R never calls an election if p < b < 1/2, and party L never if p > b > 1/2. Loosely, the above conditions guarantee that the expected downward drift in its electoral standing is more than compensated by the extra day in power. This conclusion is consistent with Figure 3 , suggesting that the second derivative approximation is valid.
The recursive structure of our model has denied us proofs for many intuitive and numerically true comparative statics. We now provide intuitions for these.
• THE VOLATILITY σ. By Lemma 2, the variance of the political slant at the barrier rises in σ. Since by Corollary 1, the waiting value is more convex than the stopping value at the barrier,
To restore smooth pasting, the election barriers intuitively should shift out. The effect on the expected ruling time is unclear. Indeed, as we saw in Figure 3 , and reasoned after (6), the government acts like a decision maker with a convex-concave "utility function", and so is ambivalent about risk.
• THE MEAN REVERSION SPEED a. By Lemma 2 and equation (9), the variance of p(t) falls in the speed a, because the slant reverts faster towards the mean level b. This either helps or hurts the government depending on whether b ≷ 1/2. Since smaller a is tantamount to greater σ, the election barriers shift out, by the above volatility analysis.
• THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD δ. The election outcome depends less on the initial campaign period poll level, the longer is the campaign period -due to the mean reversion.
This lowers the benefit from an early election, and thereby pushes out election barriers.
Yet the government may still prefer higher δ, as the maximum time in power T + δ rises.
• THE MEAN LEVEL b. By Lemma 6 (c), the expected time in power rises in the mean level b for party R, and falls for L. Calling an early election is a calculated gamble that weighs the marginal benefit of waiting AF against the marginal cost of losing, namely the extra day in power. With a greater b, we see in (4) that the marginal benefit rises for party R and falls for party L. Altogether, the barriers should be pushed up for both parties.
We now estimate our support process in Section 3 using the noisy realized polls.
A. The Discrete Time Polling Process. Politicians enjoy a variety of ways to take the pulse of the electorate -many quite qualitative. We wish to assume that governments time their elections using monthly voting intention polls. These surveys ask individuals who are planning to vote whom they would pick in a hypothetical election the next day. Since the government consists of citizens privy to the information process ξ(t), our model possibly accords no informative value to the polls (see §3.B). To escape a filtering exercise (see §8), we venture a story with a mild boundedly rational flavor. Imagine that voters cannot operate Bayes' rule, but nonetheless know whom they would vote for. Indeed, voting is a simple binary decision, and requires less introspection than deducing a probability via the nonlinear Bayes' rule. 10 Governments can then learn from the polls, since these are noisy observations of the true but unobserved political support p(t). By Lemma 4, one can view the political slant as the support process for party R -so that (1) is the law of motion for the support for party R, from Proposition 1. To estimate the model, we now write the polling process at the discrete poll times {t j }. We wish to imagine these polls as periodic observations of a phantom continuous time polling process. Since the polling error does not depend on the gap ∆ j ≡ t j+1 − t j between polls, more frequent polls corresponds to a greater polling volatility ς.
Lemma 10 (Poll Dynamics) The discrete time polling process is approximately:
where ε j ∼ N (0, 1) and ς(π, N ∆) > σ falls in N ∆, with lim N ∆↑∞ ς(π, N ∆) = σ. If we have an election at time t j+1 or at time t j then the volatility equals ς(π(t j ), √ 2N ∆ j ).
10 Two other non-behavioral stories come to mind. Polls may be relevant if there are "noise voters" -who vote randomly, unswayed by the slant. The support would behave approximately like the political slant. Polls would then be useful as they record the actual voting intentions, and follow the law of motion (7). More subtly, we may diverge from the informational representative agent, and assume heterogeneouslyinformed agents. In aggregate, the voting intentions would again obey approximately the same law of motion as the political slant, and (7) would apply. The complexity of neither approach is justified.
11 Polls enjoy a binomial distribution, which is asymptotically normal, by the Central Limit Theorem. The variance of this normal distribution is unknown, and so the t-distribution applies.
In other words, the polling process (7) We study only the voters of the big parties in U.K. -Labour (L) or Tory (R). While the number of such voters is stochastic, this does not matter as we consider proportions.
Thus, from the polls we calculate the realized values of π, which is now the Tory polling support among the big party voters. C. Estimating the Polling Process. Equation (7) is an autoregressive model. 16 We estimate the model parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS): Transform the dependent variable of (7) 
. We first estimate the parameters a and b in (7) from the regression
In finance theory, prices may be modeled as if in continuous-time, despite discrete time observations. This corresponds to a process with a certain fixed elapsed time, such as ∆ = 1.
13 Kou and Sobel (2004) find that election financial markets better predict election outcomes than polls. 14 This is consistent with Smith (2003) , who finds that when calling an early election, one experiences a decline in one's popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.
15 Since polls ask "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?", we assume that each is simply a noisy observation of the actual election outcome that would have obtained that day. Respondents saying 'don't know', 'none', or who refused are removed from the base.
16 Sanders (2003) shows that such an autoregressive model gives accurate forecasts for the U.K. polls. 17 The delta-method (see e.g. Casella and Berger, 2002) gives the standard deviation of b, σ, and σ η . where j ∼ N (0, 1). The estimation square error
the polling process error. Using (10) in Appendix A.9, write ς = σ 2 + σ 2 η d j , where
if an election (by Lemma 10), and d j = 1/∆ j otherwise. We estimate
where each e j ∼ N (0, 1), hereby implicitly assuming σ η is constant.
18 Table 1 gives four estimated parameter sets: overall, outside and inside the δ-period, and finally inside the δ-period without four governments that we call "weak" in §6.1.
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While the parameter estimates for a, b, σ, and σ η are different outside and inside the δ-period, these differences are not statistically significant. 20 On the other hand, as seen in Table 1 all parameter estimates are statistically significant. We can offer two internal consistency checks on these estimates. First, the mean poll level b = 0.47 is near the average poll level 0.46 in Figure 5 . Second, our estimate σ η = 0.12 in Table 1 is near a direct computation of the standard deviation using our t-distribution formula in (10): (N π(1 − π) ) ≈ 1/500/(π(1 − π)) which is between [0.126, 0.137], i.e., close to our estimate (0.12). 19 These R 2 levels may seem low, but are very good by comparison to the best empirical work in financial time series (see, eg., Table 3 in Campbell and Thompson (2005) ). 20 The t-statistic for the test that a coincides outside and inside the δ-period (without the weak governments) is 1.48 (1.18). The analogous t-statistics for b, σ, and σ η are 1.34 (1.11), 1.32 (1.33), and −1.00 (−0.75). The joint hypothesis that parameters don't change cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level. 21 The standard deviation of the polls is
This is consistent with Sanders (2003) . Next, the average polling time gap outside the δ-period is 0.059 years (about 22 days) and its standard deviation is 0.043 (about 16 days). Inside the δ-period, these numbers are 0.023 years (about 8 days) and 0.026 (about 9 days).
22 Thus, the average poll volatilities differ inside and outside the δ-period. But this owes to the smaller elapsed time ∆ between polls prior to an election. In the next section, we ignore this, and assume a constant polling volatility. This is for the conceptual simplicity, since had we proceeded with the richer model, our main results would still be significant, as we discuss later (footnote 30).
To estimate the constant polling volatility ς, we use the polling time differences over the entire data set (average: 0.056 years ≈ 21 days, standard deviation: 0.054 ≈ 20 days). This gives the constant volatility 0.89. For some perspective, this amounts to a fraction 48% of the average polls, using the quick approximation ςπ(1 − π)/π ≈ 0.48.
By comparison, the volatility of the S&P 500 stock market index has been about 14% over 1950-2005. Thus, volatility looms as a significantly greater factor in political than financial markets, even in a stable democracy like the U.K.
Altogether, we have established that our model in Sections 3-4 can be implemented with a fictitious continuous time polling process corresponding to our estimated discrete time process. The waiting value then satisfies the modified PDE AF (π, t) = −1, where
Further, the stopping value now solves:
With Proposition 3 and Lemma 7, this gives the optimal election barriers in (π, t)-space. 22 Here we consider the polling frequency change due to election outcomes (Lemma 10). We reject equal average polling time differences inside/outside the δ-period at 1% significance level.
We now explain the variation of the U.K. governments' election decisions, comparing theoretical and realized political support levels at the times of election calls. Because the comparison is done for the parameter estimates from §5, the poll history can be understood as the sample data, and the support levels as the out of sample data.
Election History and Outcomes
The Prime Minister chooses when to call an election by asking the Queen to dissolve parliament. She then issues a Royal Proclamation for writs to be sent out for a new parliament, starting the election timetable. According to the Parliament Act of 1911, the election must be called within T = 5 years. This has been extended twice -during the world wars, just after which our data set starts. The election timetable lasts eighteen days, plus weekends and public holidays. It starts with the dissolution of Parliament and the issue of writs on day 0, and ends on day 17, election day (a Thursday, since 1935). While election season starts with the dissolution, one may extend this period by announcing an election before dissolution, as has been done just once.
23 Table 2 Attlee lost the election to Churchill, ushering in 13 years of Tory rule. A Labour election in 1966 after two years, given a slimmer majority of four, led to a win. Finally, beset by a minority government, Labour held and won an election after just seven months in 1974. 23 In 1997, John Major announced the election on March 17 but did not dissolve parliament until April 8. As he was behind in the polls and just weeks away from the terminal date, this is one case where a longer campaign period is actually desired, notwithstanding the comparative static for δ in §4.2.
24 John Major's 1992-97 Tory government won a small majority of just 21 seats -its seat proportion was 0.516. We consider this a regular government, but this choice is moot, as we show in footnote 32. 
Election Timing
We now analyze election timing for the overall polling process estimated in Table 1 . To simultaneously analyze the optimal Labour and Tory election strategies, we draw the optimal barriers as a function of the polling support π for Tories and 1 − π for Labour.
As seen in Figure 6 and proved in Proposition 4, these barriers fall over time, gradually at first, and then steeply near the end of the term. Since the polling process favors Labour (b = 0.47), the Tory barrier is everywhere lower, i.e., the Tories optimally call elections at lower support levels. The average vertical deviation between the barrier and the realized support levels is 8.8% for all governments, 6.7% without the weak Labour governments, 11.0% for Labour (6.8% without the weak governments), and 6.7% for Tory. Including the weak Labour governments, the Tory election calls have evidently been closer to the optimal policy. This might afford some insight into why the Tories have led the polls about 33% of the time from 1945-2005, but have ruled about 58% of the time. Figure 6 are not significantly different. Further, as will be discussed in §7, the ruling time difference is not statistically significant. Thus, good luck might explain the ruling time difference just as well. 27 We consider weak governments in the next subsection. As can be seen the 1979 election is close to the regular barrier and if we include that (most of the time it was a regular government) then R 2 = 43%. we must reject the null hypothesis of a unit slope, whose t-statistic is 3.38.
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The slope test is obviously a joint test on the model and its parameters. To ensure a unified paper built on our stylized theory, we have consistently employed an extremely conservative econometric exercise -for instance, assuming parametric constancy over the time period 1945-2005 (see §7) , and introducing no other explanatory factors (see §6.3 and §8). Any additional degrees of freedom would surely have improved the fit.
29,30
Further testing the result, we ask whether our model can be significantly improved by adding new variables. We thus regressed the residuals of the regressions without the 28 We reject the slope test partly due to our high R 2 . We would likewise reject an extremely good model with slope, say, 1.01 and R 2 = 100%, for then the slope would have zero standard deviation. 29 By the same token, tests on the Black and Scholes model with historical volatility fail in many option markets, and so in practice the model is used with the so-called implied volatility that is estimated from option prices. By §4.2 and the regression Y = 0.90X, in our model the corresponding implied parameters involve lower ς or greater a. In §6.3 and §8, we discuss other factors that could improve the model. 30 Let's briefly return to our assumption of a constant volatility. The volatility estimates inside and outside the δ-period are ς i = 1.48 and ς o = 0.77. These give R 2 = 39% in the regression analysis (without the weak governments) in Figure 7 ; also, the average ruling periods for L and R in §7 are 17 and 12 years (without discounting and zero flow utility for weak governments).
weak governments on the realized election time, election year, and incumbent party. The coefficients were insignificant: All t-statistics were less than 0.9, while R 2 = 9% with the intercept, and R 2 = 12% with no intercept. Summing up, neither the party, the election year, nor the elapsed time offer any further significant predictive power.
Our contribution rests on our derivation of a rationally-founded nonlinear stopping barrier. But finally, might a simpler naive model have done better? How important is the nonlinearity? To this end, we re-ran the regressions in Figure 7 assuming that election times can be linearly explained in (π, t)-space. This gives the regression Y = 0.84−0.08t without the weak governments. While the t-statistics were 5.0 and −1.9, the R 2 of this regression drops to 27% (and just 2% with all governments). We are reassured that our optimizing nonlinear model is not only rationally justified, but also better explains the variation in the election times than an a-theoretical linear regression.
Weak Governments and Discounting
As seen in Figure 6 , the barrier strategy does not well explain weak governments. We thus mildly modify our model. Intuitively, a minority government or a slim majority government may constantly fret that it might lose that next key vote. Still, even if it does not enjoy governing, it can aspire for a stronger government some day. We now assume that while in power, normal governments have unit flow utility and weak governments zero flow utility; further, parties discount future utility. While a weak government will not enjoy its time in power until it wins an election, its optimization is still well-defined, since the election timing choice is a pure option. In the interests of simplicity, we do not model forced elections (i.e. 1979), nor do we distinguish between weak and initially weak governments. The election barrier only depends on the initial status (weak or not).
Let Γ w (t, π) be the time value of a weak government. Since it earns no flow utility in the current term, Γ(t, π) ≥ Γ w (t, π). As the election is called when Γ vanishes, we have:
Lemma 11 (Weak Timing) Weak governments call earlier elections than regular ones.
Next, consider the role of time discounting. 31 Intuitively, a weak government only 31 In other words, one day of power at time t is now worth e −rt days, where r > 0 is the discount rate. If we define 1 w = 0 for weak governments, and otherwise 1, then the value equations (2) and (3) become earns payoffs in the future, and thus its discounted value falls if it calls an election later.
On the other hand, a regular government enjoys unit flow utility and discounting lessens the present value of future flow utilities. Thus, its benefit from an earlier election falls.
Lemma 12 (Discounting) Discounting postpones regular governments' elections and advances weak governments' elections.
In financial option markets, the Black and Scholes model is used with implied volatility, rather than historical volatility. Similarly here, we find that an annual discount rate of 40% best explains the realized elections. To make sense of such a high rate, recall that the Prime Minister's term in power may be shorter than his party's, and so he may less heavily weight future benefits of power. For instance, Tony Blair stepped down before his term is over, just as did Churchill (1955) , Wilson (1976) , and Thatcher (1990).
We do not re-derive all of our results for this revised model, but proceed directly to the empirical analysis. As can be seen in Figure 8 , the weak governments have called elections near their revised optimal barriers. By Figures 6 and 8, these changes for weak governments have little effect on strong governments' stopping barriers. The average vertical deviation between the barriers and election support levels is 6.9% for Labour and 7.7% for Tory. Thus, the realized Labour strategy is closer to the policy that maximizes the expected discounted time in power, given the weak Labour governments. Figure 9 shows the support level analysis at the election announcement times. For all the governments we now have Y = −0.38 + 1.58X, where Y is the realized political support level when the election is announced and X is the corresponding model support. As in §6.2, the intercept is insignificant and the slope is significant. We now have R 2 = 39% for the revised model with all governments, far above the earlier level of 10%.
32 Once again, the polls π and elapsed time t are clearly important decision factors for understanding election timing, even when we admit a distinction between weak and regular governments. With a zero intercept, we have Y = 0.88X, almost the same as the corresponding regression in §6.2. And we still reject a unit slope, given the high R 2 .
Since we use an implied discount rate, this section is not an out-of-sample test, but is rather is the best fit parsimonious model. Without discounting we have R 2 = 14% for all the governments, which is only slightly better than in Figure 7 .
THE OPTION VALUE OF ELECTION TIMING
The option to freely time an election obviously raises a party's expected time in power. We now measure the value of this option, by comparing the expected ruling times F
and F R (π, 0) with their analogues for fixed electoral timing. We take this expectation using the long-run density of the polls π from Lemma 3 with the estimated parameters in §5.C. 33 The predicted times are too much high by historical standards -about 65.8 years for Labour, and 24.4 for Tory. While parties have diverged from our basic optimal exercise rule (Tory less so, see Figure 6 ), the resulting ruling times have been much shorter. Labour governments have averaged 6.3 years in our sample, and Tory 11.6 years. 34 We next offer three explanations for this shortfall: (i) weak governments calling early elections, (ii)
precluding "opportunistic elections", and (iii) nonconstant parameters.
First, we consider the model of §6.3 where weak governments do not enjoy their time in power, and the future is discounted by 40%. Table 3 reports the resulting expected times in power with the revised election barriers: 57.7 years for Labour and 22.4 years 32 We did not call John Major's Tory 1992-97 government weak since its initial seat proportion was 0.516. Otherwise, the R 2 in Figure 9 would rise to 42% from 39%. Further, if we considered Callaghan's 1974-79 Labour government (whose election was forced) as regular, then the R 2 would fall to 35%. 33 The density is almost moot: The expected ruling times F L (π, 0), F R (π, 0) are nearly constant in π. 34 Between 1945 and 2005, there have been only 7 ruling periods, and so the standard deviations are high: 1.2 for Labour and 7.3 for Tory. In other words, these differences are not significant. for Tory. Evidently, this alone cannot account for the divergent expected times in power.
Second, we assume that elections cannot be called within the first three years of a term since governments fear punishment for opportunism. 35 We thus reformulate our timing exercise in the numerical optimization, asking that elections be called in years 3-5; this eliminates repeatedly calling an election when riding high in the polls, and would lessen the expected time in power to 36 years for Labour and 17.1 years for Tory (see Table 3 ). We consider an additional form of parametric non-constancy -distinct parameters inside and outside the δ-period. 38 More specifically, we employ the δ-period and pre-δ parameters in Table 1 and their polling frequencies. As can be seen from Table 3 , the distinct parameters would dramatically cut the expected times in power to 15.9 years for Labour and 12.4 years for Tory. These expected times are much closer because the campaign periods have favored Tory -the polls have averaged 0.52 (see Table 1 ).
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Since 1945, the Tories have led the polls about 33% of the time but have ruled about 58% of the time. We see that this might be mostly explained by a campaign-period edge that Tory enjoys. But we have that this cannot be the whole story. It might just owe to dumb luck (see footnote 34), since Labour has been so often beset by weak governments.
Motivated by Table 3 , we focus on our best explanation above, and assume distinct pre-δ and δ-period polling process parameters in Table 1 . If the U.K. implemented a fixed electoral cycle with four year terms, then the expected duration in power given an optimal policy would fall by a factor of 1.7 -from 15.9 to 9 years for Labour, and 12.4 to 7.5 years for Tory. Labour's expected percentage time in power would drop from 56.2%
faster about a higher mean, with less volatility. 38 By §5, these parameters are not statistically significantly different. This, of course, does not at all suggest that they must coincide, which cannot be proven. 39 Had we used these parameter values also in the support level analysis in §6.2, we would have R 2 = 36% for the regular governments.
to 54.5%. An overarching observation here is that flexible electoral timing favors the dominant party more than does fixed election cycles.
We conclude with a simple welfare analysis: Does endogenous timing on average help or hurt the voters? Barring considerations of weak governments, we can intuitively conclude it hurts. If the election is called at the four year mark, when it would have been forced, then voters are unaffected. If the government is standing high in the polls earlier, then it calls an election. This choice is welfare-neutral for the voters, since the best party is already in power. Finally, if a government has low support at the four year mark, then it delays the election. But in this case, it is most likely that the wrong party is in power, and delay hurts voters. Thus, flexible electoral timing hurts voters.
CONCLUSION
Summary. Optimal timing of votes and elections is an important subject, and periodically the topic of great media speculation in some countries. In this paper, we have modeled electoral timing as an optimization by the ruling party. We have developed and analyzed a tractable electoral timing model capturing the informational richness of the political setting: namely, a forward-looking optimizing exercise using an informationally-derived mean-reverting polling process. The election is called the first moment the polling process hits a nonlinear stopping barrier. We think that this is a substantively novel timing exercise for economics (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . The ruling party holds a renewable finite time horizon American option and the exercise decision is delayed.
We then fit the polling process to the post-war Labour-Tory rivalry of the U.K. We found a high correlation between the realized political support levels and the model support levels at the election call dates. The weak governments aside, parties in power do indeed try to maximize their expected time in power, and election times are triggered by the polls and the time from the last election. We show that the value of the option to choose the election time can be very substantial, and favors the dominant party. Further, weak governments are explained by introducing zero flow utility and a high discount rate.
While this paper was written, Gordon Brown became Prime Minister and the U.K. press actively speculated on an early election. Our model predicts that if the Prime Minister follows the dynamically optimal strategy, then there is a high chance for an early election, most likely in 2008. By using the poll results on August 11, 2007 (ipsos-mori.com) , the parameter estimates from §5, and a Monte Carlo Simulation with 100,000 random out-comes, we find that the respective chances of early election in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 are 0.34, 0.40, 0.17, and 0.09 . By contrast, the respective market odds 40 on August 20, 2007 were 7/2, 7/4, 6/4, and 8/1, so that the market's best guess is 2009. Some Caveats. As usual, our tractability owes to some simplifying assumptions. 41 Our objective function is straightforward, positing that governments maximize their expected (possibly discounted) time in power. We have rendered this a decision-theoretic exercise, assuming that the government cannot affect the polling process. These simplifications are not irrelevant, but have been best studied elsewhere (eg. Austen- Smith and Banks (1988) deal with the richer picture). Our single-minded theory explains much of the variation in election timing decisions with just the polls and time since the last election.
The U.K. employs the standard "first-past-the-post" electoral system. There are now 646 seats in the House of Commons, so that a party must capture 324 for an overall majority. But our theory assumes that when calling an election, the government acts as if it must win the popular vote. This almost holds in our data set. In October 1951, the Tories formed the government but lost the popular vote by 0.8%. In February 1974, the reverse occurred: Labour formed the government, but trailed the popular vote by 0.8%.
The errors above are small and of opposite parity, and so this is not inconsistent with our assumption. Dealing with this more formally would require a treatment of the seat proportions. As seen in Table 2 , the winning big party has consistently had the greatest seat proportion. But the deviation of the seat and vote proportions is positively correlated with the vote proportion, and so lies outside our model. 42 We have only employed the public voting intention polls. In fact, the government surely has more accurate information, possibly from private polls, etc. This would raise the polling sample size, and lower the polling volatility and so the election barriers. The government would then require a filtering exercise, estimating the political support at each moment in time. Also, testing our barriers with an unobserved state would be very hard. We have avoided this nontrivial and unprofitable exercise, but have verified that our barriers are quite robust to the variance specification. But the normative predictions of the 40 See http://odds.betrescue.com. These are gambling odds and do not directly represent the true chances that the event will occur since they include a profit margin (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odds). If we assume a constant profit margin then the odds' implied probabilities are 0.17, 0.35, 0.40, and 0.08. 41 We have also ignored any strategic incentives to vote, but these are surely quite minuscule in a national election (see eg. Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996) . As noted, we also assume that voters simply myopically vote for the best current party, and do not anticipate the scandals or laurels to come. Ours is a theory of strategizing and forward-looking behavior by the government, and not voters. 42 For the elections in our sample, an additional 1% in the polls raises the seat count just over 2%.
model -the expected durations in power -are sensitive to the variance specification.
These limitations of our theory notwithstanding, we capture the central element of this crucial timing decision of a parliamentary democracy. Attesting to this, our empirical analysis explains a significant proportion of the variation in the election timing decisions.
A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2: Variance of the Political Slant Process
Let us rewrite (1): dp(t) + ap(t)dt = abdt + σp(t)(1 − p(t))dW (t), which gives e at dp(t) + ae
Note that the left-hand-side equals d (e at p(t)) and therefore, by integration,
)b which we denote by m(p, t).
By (8), the variance of p(t):
and using p(t) = m(t) + v(t)ε, where ε is a standard normal variable, gives
suppressing the p argument. Thus, we have the partial derivatives:
We find
where ε > 0 is small, and we get that the variance of p(t) rises in the diffusion coefficient σ.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3: Derivation of the Stationary Density
We appeal to Karlin and Taylor (1981, pages 220 and 241) . If dp(t) =μ(p)dp + σ(p)dW has a stationary density ψ(y) = lim t→∞ (∂/∂y)P (p(t) ≤ y|p(0) = x), then it obeys the stationary forward Fokker-Planck equation
for (1), we have: 
where p 0 ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary, and C 0 , C 1 and C 2 are constants.
Claim 1 (Entrance boundary)
The extremes 0 and 1 are entrance boundaries, i.e., they cannot be reached from (0, 1) but the process can begin from the boundaries.
Proof: We consider the left boundary; the right is analyzed using q(t) = 1 − p(t) and
The sufficient conditions that 0 be an entrance (see Karlin and Taylor (1981, pages 226-242) ψ(p)dp = 1 and, thus, the stationary density
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2: Existence of Smooth Values
If the government stands at 100% on the day election is announced, it loses the election with a positive chance, say at least > 0. This yields an upper bound Ω 
where Af (p, t) is given by (4) on U . 43 Ito's Lemma therefore applies:
. Finally, we restrict to the optimal continuation set U , namely, those (p, t 0 ) where continuing at time t 0 with p = p(t 0 ) is optimal. Since it is also true that E[τ U − t 0 + Ω(p(τ U ))] = F (p, t 0 ), we conclude that F (p, t 0 ) = f (p, t 0 ).
In other words, F inherits the smoothness properties of f .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5: Convex Waiting Values
We want the map p → F (p, t) to be convex for fixed t. Let P be the random variable formed by updating the prior p using an additional current (time-t) binary signal I sending p to P 1 with chance λ and P 2 with chance 1 − λ. Then p = E I [P ] = λP 1 + (1 − λ)P 2 by the Law of Iterated Expectations. Since the information set {I, ξ} allows a weakly better decision than the Gaussian public information process ξ alone:
Therefore, λF (P 1 , t) + (1 − λ)F (P 2 , t) ≥ F (λP 1 + (1 − λ)P 2 , t). So F is convex in p. Evans (1994) , under our conditions, the PDE Lu(x) = f in U and u = 0 on ∂U has a solution, given the operator Lu = − a ij (x)u ij + b i (x)u i + c(x)u. In our case, we set x = (p, t) and u(x) = F (p, t) − Ω(p) for suitable PDE coefficients.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 6 (b): Value Monotonicity
A.6 Proof of Lemma 7 (b): Smooth Pasting
Let us fix party R. We show the differentiability of the solution to Proposition 3.
STEP 1: RIGHT DERIVATIVE. By Proposition 3, F (p, t) = Ω(p) for all p ≥ β(t) and, hence, the right derivatives agree: F p (β(t)+, t) = Ω p (β(t)).
STEP 2: LEFT DERIVATIVE LOWER BOUND. Since F (p, t) > Ω(p) for p < β(t), and the left derivative F p (β(t)−, t) exists by Proposition 2, and likewise Ω p (β(t)) exists, we have F p (β(t)−, t) ≤ Ω p (β(t)). Thus, we must show F p (β(t)−, t) ≥ Ω p (β(t)). The inequality followed from the optimality of the election time -since τp −ε need not be optimal starting at slantp at timet, we must have Et [Ω(p(τp −ε 
ζ(t) + O(ζ(t))
2 .
Since lim ε↓0 τp −ε = 0, and O(ζ(τp −ε )) is of order ε 2 , we now get F p (p−,t) ≥ Ω p (p). 44 The argument is motivated by the proof of Lemma 7.8 in §2.7 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998) .
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4: Optimal Election Barriers
Fix party R. Our argument is inspired by that in Jacka (1991) for American put options.
STEP 1: MONOTONICITY. We have F (p, t) − Ω(p) ≥ 0, with equality along the barrier. Since F (p, t) is decreasing in t by Lemma 6, we have for any ∆ > 0 and ε > 0:
Therefore, β(t − ∆) > β(t) − ε for all ε > 0. Hence, β(·) is nonincreasing.
STEP 2: RIGHT CONTINUITY. By definition of p = β(t) as the least solution to F (p, t) = Ω(p), the electoral continuation region assumes the form U = {(p, t) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, T )|p(t) < β(t)}, which is open. Since (β(t i ), t i ) ∈ U for any convergent sequence t i →t, we have (β,t) ∈ U , whereβ = lim sup i→∞ β(t i ). This gives a lower semicontinuous barrier, asβ ≥ β(t). Since it is also non-increasing, it is right continuous. STEP 3: LEFT CONTINUITY. Fix 0 < t < T . Since β is monotone, the left limit β(t−) exists. Assume, for a contradiction, that β(t−) > β(t). Now, pick 0 < ε < (β(t−) − β(t))/2. Then F (β(t i ) − ε, t i ) > Ω(β(t i ) − ε) for all increasing sequences t i ↑ t, and so by continuity, in the limit we have F (β(t−) − ε, t) ≥ Ω(β(t−) − ε). Since (β(t−) − 2ε, t) ∈ U by the structure of U , we have F (β(t−) − 2ε, t) > Ω(β(t−) − 2ε).
In other words, β(t−) − 2ε < β(t), contrary to our choice of ε. Thus, β(t−) = β(t).
A.8 Proof of Lemma 8: The Shape of the Victory Chance
We first consider party R. Let p(0) = p > 
